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Abstract
The purpose of this work is to show under what conditions a marginally progressive income tax emer-
ges as the result of political competition between two parties when labor is elastically supplied and can-
didates are uncertain about voters' decisions on election day. Assuming a decreasing wage elasticity of
labor supply, if we follow Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), only marginal-rate progressive taxes are cho-
sen by both candidates in equilibrium. If, instead, we adopt Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) probabi-
listic voting model, the equilibrium tax schedule will be progressive as long as the political power of
the rich voter is sufficiently low. The degree of progressivity decreases with population polarization.
Keywords: Political economy, progressive taxation, elastic labor supply.
JEL Clasification: D3, D63, D72, H24.
1. Introduction
The question “why do progressive taxes emerge in industrialized countries?” dates from
Mirrlees’ seminal paper (1971). He showed that marginal-rate progressive tax schedules, like
those of industrialized societies, were hardly optimal unless we had a low elasticity of labor
supply. Growing literature on the political economy of taxation, inspired by Roberts (1977),
Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), questioned whether high marginal taxes could
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into account, restrictions on the tax schedule were imposed making difficult to study tax pro-
gressivity. Among those studying tax progressivity, few of them considered disincentive ef-
fects from taxation (De Donder and Hindriks, 2003), since most literature was based on the
exogenous income hypothesis, see for example Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín (1995), Roemer
(1999), Carbonell-Nicolau and Klor (2003) and Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007).
Early literature on the political economy of taxation assumed a proportional income tax.
Under some conditions on preferences, such as single-crossing, a Condorcet winner (CW)
exists and both Downsian candidates play the CW tax rate in equilibrium. In the absence of
labor disincentives (an inelastic labor supply), if the median income is below the mean, then
the equilibrium marginal tax rate equals 100%. Even if an endogenous labor supply is as-
sumed, taxes are still strictly positive and rise with inequality, defined as the ratio of aver-
age income to median income.
Nevertheless, assuming a linear income tax schedule will not help us to understand the
fact that, in most industrial economies, marginal tax rates increase with income. The aim of
this paper is to understand why there is a democratic demand for income tax progressivity.
In order to have a tax schedule that allows for (marginal-rate) progressivity, we need at least
three parameters to vote for1. One parameter specifies the lump-sum transfer (or level of
public good), another the linear tax rate, and the last captures the concavity (regressivity) or
convexity (progressivity) of the tax schedule. Thus, we are facing a multidimensional voting
model. Conditions for the existence of a CW in models with a multidimensional policy space
are known to be very restrictive. For the quadratic tax function, De Donder and Hindriks
(2003) and Hindriks (2001) show that it is hard to avoid voting cycles. Approaches other
than the direct democracy approach should be considered.
In a citizen-candidate model, Carbonell and Klor (2003) found that, under some condi-
tions, only increasing marginal tax rates are implemented in equilibrium. Roemer (1999) de-
veloped the PUNE concept (Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium). The platform chosen by the
party is the outcome of intraparty negotiation among party members. In equilibrium, both
parties announce marginal-rate progressive taxes. 
In this paper, we adopt the probabilistic voting model introduced by Coughlin and
Nitzan (1981) and Coughlin (1992), micro-founded subsequently by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). When voters cast their ballots in favor of one candidate or another, they consider is-
sues other than economic ones, for instance ideology. Nonetheless, the bigger the difference
in economic utility, the higher the probability that a given voter will choose the candidate
that brings him the highest (economic) utility. Conditions for the existence of an equilibri-
um are less restrictive in the Coughlin model. A CW need not exist and, when it does exist,
the equilibrium tax schedule need not coincide with the CW tax schedule.
The probabilistic model can be understood as the outcome of a political process where
voters choose between candidates probabilistically, with the probability to vote for one can-
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stressed by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) in their Theorem 1, involves the maximization of a
Nash welfare function. Indeed, in both models, Coughlin (CN) and Lindbeck and Weibull
(LW), the equilibrium income tax maximizes some welfare function. In this sense the equi-
librium income tax is efficient; it is on the economy’s utility frontier. We show which con-
ditions on the welfare function and the labor supply need to be satisfied for a marginal pro-
gressive tax to emerge in equilibrium.
For simplicity, we assume quasi-linear preferences, which imply a zero income effect.
Therefore, when the tax rate paid by a given group increases, labor supply unambiguously
decreases. Labor supply responses will add another mechanism for a given vote to be easier
to catch. If the elasticity of labor supply decreases with wage, then we could tax the rich
heavily in comparison with the poor, since the former reduce their labor supply to a lesser
extent in response to a tax increase. In this respect, there is more scope for tax progressivity
than in the fixed (exogenous) income model. It is worth noting that there are few estimates
of the elasticity of labor supply by income groups. Saez (2004) finds that families and indi-
viduals in the mid-to-upper income bracket do not appear to be sensitive to taxation. Signif-
icant elasticities are found, though, at the very top of the income distribution. Whether those
elasticities could be explained solely by the evolution of marginal tax rates is not clear, given
the heterogeneity in size of responses across time.
The probabilistic voting model would give credible predictions in any of these three sce-
narios: voters vote probabilistically, candidates are uncertain of vote decisions, or we have
interest groups representing voters that compete for influence.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: section 2 presents the model; section 3 draws
voters’ labor supply as a function of the implemented tax schedule. Preferences over tax
schedules by groups are studied in section 4. Section 5 describes the (CN) and (LW) proba-
bilistic voting model and presents the main results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
We develop a static model of political competition between two Downsian parties, A and
B. Since voters are ideological, candidates or parties are uncertain how voters’ economic
preferences can be translated into party preferences. The (CN) and (LW) model account dif-
ferently for voters’ ideology. We will describe in detail both probabilistic voting models in
section 5. Parties announce simultaneously a policy platform (tC,GC) with C =A, B; consist-
ing of a vector of marginal income tax rates that finances lump-sum transfers and a public
good. Parties choose the policy platform that maximizes their probability of winning and
commit to the platform announced. The probability of winning is an increasing function of
the voting share. For simplicity, we assume the probability of winning equals aggregate vot-
ing share. The party holding the majority of votes wins the election. Once the equilibrium
platform is implemented, voters make labor decisions. We solve the model backwards.
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Voters are divided into 3 groups: poor (P), middle class (M) and rich (R). Population size
is normalized to one. We assume the proportion of voters in group P equals the proportion of
voters in group R, which is α. Thus the proportion of voters in group M is 1-2α. Groups are
differentiated by their wage (ability) wj, with j=P,M,R, such that 0= wP < wM < wR.
Total income of an individual in group j is yj = wjlj, where lj is labor effort chosen by
voter j. Consumption equals after-tax income, cj = yj – T(yj), with T(yj) being total tax pay-
ment by voter j.
We denote by Uj (cj, lj) the utility of a member of group j with consumption cj, and labor
supply lj ∈[0,L], and assume that Uj is increasing in consumption (cj) and decreasing in labor
(lj) which can be seen as labor effort or hours worked per week. For simplicity we assume
that the utility function is quasilinear in consumption: Uj = u[cj + v(L - lj)], and Uj is well be-
haved: u’ >0, u’’ <0, v’ >0, and v’’ <0. This utility specification will allow us to make
straightforward comparison between outcomes of the two probabilistic voting models. We
assume the wage elasticity of labor supply, defined as , decreases.
2.2. The Tax Schedule
Each group of voters j pays a marginal tax rate tj on income and receives a lump-sum
transfer Gj. All income tax collected finances a public good level, G and lump-sum transfers
GP and GM, that favor groups P and M, respectively. It is assumed that GR =0. From the gov-
ernment budget condition:
Provided our normalization of wages, where wP =0, the tax rate paid by group P is tP =0.
This  reduces  the  dimensionality  of  the  economic  platform  to  t =(tM,  tR) ∈ T,  with  T  :
[0,1]×[0,1] as the set of possible income tax rates and G = (GM, GR)∈ 2
+. The tax schedule
will be marginal rate progressive whenever the income tax rate increases with income. This
means, in our particular case, that tR – tM >0. Further conditions should be given to guaran-
tee that indeed yP ≤ yM ≤ yR. Given the disincentive effects of taxation we do not expect tM or
tR to be larger than the income tax rates that maximize G. From the government budget bal-
anced condition, the political struggle takes place between two tax parameters: (tM, tR), and
the lump-sum transfers (GP, GM), we can express the level of public good as:
(1)
Since labor is endogenously supplied, the tax schedule should satisfy the following con-
dition:
yR (t) ≥ yM (t) ≥ yP (t) (2)
Gt y t y G G MM RR P M t,G () =− ()−− () −− () 12 12 αα α α
Gt y t y G G jj j
jP R
MM P M t,G () =+ − ()−− − ()
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groups R, M and M, P. Note that from preferences’ quasi-linear specification, labor supply does
not depend on G. Once the winning platform is in place, voters choose their before tax income,
given the parameters of the tax function (t, G), this is equivalent to choosing their labor supply.
3. Optimal labor supply
Given the tax parameters (t, G, G,), voter-j decides on consumption and labor supply:
The optimal labor supply:
where xj = cj + v(L – lj) is consumption plus utility from leisure, and h = v’-1. From concavi-
ty of v we know that h(.) is decreasing in its argument. From the quasi-linear specification of
xj there are no income effects, which implies that ∂lj/∂tj < 0, ∂lj/∂wj > 0, and ∂lj/∂G = 0. As-
sume all voters supply strictly positive units of labor, that is (1 – tj)wj – v’(L) > 0 for all j,
this will be the case, for example for v’(L) = 0.
Given this optimal labor supply the tax schedule feasibility constraint in (2) can be
rewritten as:
The above feasibility conditions give an upper bound to tM and tR; which are increasing
in (wR – wM) and (wM – wP), respectively.
4. Preferences over tax schedules
Next we derive group-specific preferences over (t,G), given G(t,G) specified in (1) with
pre-tax incomes yM = wM(L – h(1 - tM)wM) and yR = wR(L – h(1 – tR)wR).
The indirect utility of voter P,
VP (t,G) = u(G(t,G) + GP) (2)
Remember P does not pay income taxes. So P objective is to set (tM, tR) that maximizes
the lump-sum transfer GP, naturally, GM = G = 0. GP as a function of tax parameters becomes,
L w ww ht ww ht w
Lw w w h t w whw
RM R R R M M M
MP M M M PP
− () ≥− () () −− () ()
− () ≥− () () − ()
11
1
10 0 1 − () − ′ − () () ′() = ′() >⇔= − − () () tw vLl ux ux l Lh tw jj j j j j jj ;       
max      . .   
, cl
jj j j j j j
jj
Uc vL l st c t wl G G +− () () ≤− ()++ 1
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GP (t) = ((1 – 2α) tM yM + αtR yR)/α
Assume that, 2. 
It is easy to show that GP will be concave in (t) since provided that,
The f.o.c. for a maximum, 
(3)
(4)
The preferred tax schedule of voter P is the peak of the Laffer curve.
Rearranging terms in (3) and (4), the tax schedule maximizing G satisfies,
(5)
Where εj is the elasticity of labor supply to changes in the tax rate tj with j=M,R.
Whether voter P prefers a tax schedule that is proportional, marginal rate progressive or
regressive depends upon the specific utility function. We assume that ∂2lj/∂t2
j ≤ 0, so εj will
decrease with tj
3. After some computations . Provided that εl is decreasing in wj, by
assumption, εj will be increasing in wj.
These properties together ensures that the tax schedule maximizing GP, determined from
equation (5), can not be marginal-rate regressive. To show this, consider εj at the proportional
tax rate tM = tR = t, since εj is increasing in wj, then εM(t) ≤ εR(t). If we increase tM such that tM
> tR = t, being εj decreasing in tj then, necessarily εM(tM) < εM(t) ≤ εR(t). Which proves that, the
preferred tax schedule of voter P is either proportional (tM = tR) or progressive (tM < tR).
Group M pays income taxes at rate tM and receives GM + G. Thus, group M preferred in-
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The indirect utility VM(t,G) reaches a (global) maximum at (tM,tR) = (0,t ˆR) and
Notice that t ˆR maximizes G(t,G) for a given tM. Such a tax schedule is marginal rate pro-
gressive since tR – tM = t ˆR > 0.
Group R pays income taxes at rate tR and receives the lump-sum transfer G. Thus
group R preferred income tax minimizes his tax burden. Voter R indirect utility function
is given by,
Her utility is maximized at the regressive tax schedule: tM = t ˆM and tR = 0. Remember
that t ˆM maximizes G(t,G) for a given tR. Naturally, he prefers to set GP = GM =0.
The following picture shows voters’ bliss-points4.
Vu t w l G t t G G RR R R M R P M t,G () =− ()+ () () 1, , ,





Vu t w l G t t G G G MM M M M R P M M t,G () =− () + () + () 1, , ,
It should be noted that no CW winner exists in our voting game, as shown in figure 1.
Any point in the rectangle 0RPM can be defeated by a coalition of two groups. The shaded
areas in figure 1 represent the alternatives that can defeat alternative “o”, which can be de-
feated by other alternatives generating a cycle (the voting paradox).
Next section describes how political competition takes place in both probabilistic voting
models and studies conditions for tax progressivity in equilibrium. 
Figure 1. P, M and R’s bliss points16 JENNY DE FREITAS
5. The Probabilistic Voting Model
5.1. CN Probabilistic voting model
The probabilistic voting model developed by Coughlin relaxes one of the assumptions
of the traditional Downsian model: candidates’ certainty of voters’ reactions in response to
their platforms.
In Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Coughlin (1992), even after voters have learned the
proposals of both candidates in the race, candidates are uncertain how voters will act on elec-
tion day. This would also be the case if voters’ decisions were stochastic in nature.
Two possible interpretations of the Coughlin model are that voters do not vote determin-
istically but they are still rational: they are more likely to vote for the candidate whose poli-
cy platform brings them the highest utility.
This raises the question why voters do not vote in consonance with their economic pref-
erences. This leads to the second interpretation of the Coughlin model, where voters do in-
deed vote deterministically but there are other issues apart from economic ones, so they may
not vote for the party that promises them the best economic platform. Here voters are ideo-
logical.
Candidates use a logit model to infer voters’ selection probabilities. In an economy with
J voters, the probability of a voter from group j voting for candidate A is equal to the rela-
tive utility that j derives from A’s platform compared to the utility derived from B’s platform,
We shall, by convenient abuse of notation, generally denote  j
C(tC,GC;t-C,G-C)=  j
C, with
C=A,B. Note that voters do not abstain, they either vote for A or B, so  j
A +  j
B = 1. The high-
er the economic utility of platform A, the higher the probability that group j (or a represen-
tative voter from group j) will vote for A. Parties are office-motivated. They simultaneously
choose the policy platform that maximizes  C= ∑j j
C with C=A,B. Among the main findings
of the probabilistic voting model, we can cite the following:
1. Equilibrium existence and uniqueness. There exists equilibrium (a saddle point to
 C(.)) as long as Vj(tC,GC) is quasiconcave on (tC,GC). Note this is a multidimension-
al problem and a CW may not exist.
2. Policy convergence. Both candidates face a similar problem  A(tA,GA; tB,GB) for A
and 1- A(tA,GA; tB,GB) for B. This implies that they both choose the same policy plat-
form and they have 50% probability of winning.
3. The outcome of the political competition game is the social alternative that maxi-
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AB ; () = ()
() + ()Lindbeck and Weibull give a microfundation to (generalize) Coughlin’s model. They in-
troduced ideology explicitly. A voter may cast their ballot in favor of a candidate that brings
him a lower economic utility if the utility from the non-economic issue outweighs the eco-
nomic loss. Although voters may indeed vote deterministically, the LW model is called a
probabilistic voting model because of its close links with Coughlin’s model.
Next we describe and follow LW approach; we will discuss afterwards how our predic-
tions change if we follow Coughlin.
5.2. LW Probabilistic voting model
There is a continuum of voters in each group differing in their ideological position,
measured as their relative preference from one party over another. In order to combine the
economic and ideological side of voters’ utility we assume that voter i in group j will vote
for party A if the extra “economic” utility he gets from A’s platform outweighs his ideolog-
ical preference for B as opposed to A. We can capture this preference for a party in parame-
ter σij, which represents the location of individual i from group j along the real line. If σij is
positive (negative), i in group j prefers B to A (A to B) for the same announced platform. Vot-
ers with a σij of around zero are ideologically neutral; they mainly evaluate the economic
benefits they receive from the different platforms proposed by parties. 
The utility of a ij-voter is simply Vj(tA,GA) if party A wins and it is Vj(tB,GB) + σij oth-
erwise.
A voter i in group j will vote for A if:
(6)
We assume that σij has a group-specific cumulative distribution function Fj with densi-
ty fj and support on the real line. The density function around zero summarizes how many
ideologically neutral voters we have in each group. We define the swing voter in group j as
the voter that is indifferent between party A and party B given the platforms announced.
Let’s call it σj, from (6), σj = V(tA,GA) – V(tB,GB). Voters in group j with an ideological pa-
rameter, σij, below (or above) σj will vote for party A (respectively B). We assume there is
no abstention.
The total share of votes, and therefore the probability of winning of party A in group j,  j
A:
Where nj is the proportion of voters in group j.
Therefore, the probability of winning of party A is:
πσ σ σ j
A





ij t, G t, G
AB () > () +σ
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(7)
We next introduce conditions that guarantee existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium of the electoral game. These conditions, from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987),
Enelow and Hinich (1989) and Couglhin (1992), were unified by Banks and Duggan
(2004). In addition, we need to add an extra condition, since in our model, Fj is not inde-
pendent of j.
Conditions On Fj and aggregate Vj:
1) C1. Fj is continuous and strictly increasing.
2) C2. Aggregate concavity holds, for any t-C,  C(tA, tB) is strictly concave on tC, C = A,B:
3) C3. Laussel and Le Breton (2002). This guarantees that there is no profitable devia-
tion at the political equilibrium of this game. 
∀j fj is symmetric around zero and fj (0) > 0.
The main difference between CN and LW is how voters’ ideology determines their vot-
ing decisions. It is easy to show that CN is as if a voter i in group j with ideological param-
eter σij favors party A whenever (1-σij)Vj(tA,GA) > σijVj(tB,GB) and σij is distributed uniform-
ly on the interval [0,1].
Next we present some results for the LW game and compare to CN results afterwards.
We assume for LW that u(xj) is logarithmic with xj = cj + v(L-lj).
Without loss of generality we write the probability of winning of party A simply as
π(t,G;tB,GB), where (t, G) is the platform chosen by party A, and (tB, GB) the platform cho-
sen by B.
Lemma 1. Assume conditions C1, C2 and C3 are satisfied. The bliss points of group P,
M and R are never part of a political equilibrium.
Proof:
a) The bliss point of P is not an equilibrium. If it were an equilibrium, then for a given,
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which proves that the income tax preferred by group P is not an equilibrium.
b) The bliss point of M is not an equilibrium.
which proves that an increase in tM and a decrease in tR, from M’s preferred plat-
form, improves party A chances of winning. Therefore, the income tax preferred by
group M can not be part of equilibrium.
c) The bliss-point of R is not an equilibrium.
which proves that the income tax preferred by group R is not an equilibrium.
The above Lemma proves that, under this political process, the outcome will never cor-
respond with any group’s ideal income tax schedule. This is because the probabilistic model
implies some compromise among voters. This explains the fact that none of the ideal income
tax schedules constitutes an equilibrium. The fact that the probabilistic model in a multidi-
mensional space picks a policy that is different from a voter ideal has already been stressed
in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2006).
Proposition 1. Assume C1, C2 and C3 are satisfied. Assume that for all tR ≤ t ˆR and tM ≤
t ˆM the feasibility constraint in (2) is satisfied. There exists a unique interior equilibrium.
By symmetry of the game, in equilibrium we have policy coincidence, tA = tB = t and GA
= GB = G with tM < t ˆM and tR < t ˆR.
Proof. Uniqueness comes from the fact that we maximize a strictly concave function
(C2) under a convex set. By symmetry of the model if (tA,GA ;tB,GB) is an equilibrium so
it is (tB,GB;tA,GA), and from uniqueness tA = tB = t and GA = GB = G. If (2) is not bind-
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and Weibull, 1987). Thus, no tax tj > t ˆj with j=M, R; will be chosen in equilibrium since
it is Pareto dominated. From Lemma 1, we know that the equilibrium tax schedule is dif-
ferent from (t ˆM,t ˆR), the bliss-point for group P. Note that the feasibility constraint in (2)
can be omitted (will not be binding) as long as t ˜R ≥ t ˆj and t ˜M ≥ t ˆM where t ˜R is the low-
est possible tR satisfying (2) (remember that yj is decreasing in tj): yR (t ˜R) – yM(0) = 0.
Similarly for tM, t ˜M: yM (t ˜) – yP = 0. Moreover t ˜R, t ˆM,are higher the higher is wR and the
lower is wP.
From policy coincidence, note that the outcome of the LW game, from the maximiza-
tion of (6), is equivalent to the result of the maximization of an Utilitarian Social Wel-
fare Function SLW, with weights (or political power) on voters P, M, and R utility given
by α fP(0), (1-2α) fM(0) and α fR(0), respectively.
Where fj = fj (0), for j = P, M, R.
Since we are interested in tax progressivity, next we develop conditions under which a
progressive income tax emerges as an outcome of the LW game. Note that our assumption
regarding the elasticity of labor supply (we assume that εl decreases with w) facilitates the
implementation of a progressive income tax, since group R’s labor response to changes in
the marginal tax rate they pay is lower than that of group M. Moreover, the decreasing mar-
ginal utility of consumption (net of labor disincentives) also facilitates the emergence of a
progressive income tax schedule, since it increases the political power of groups P and M
compared to group R. Despite all this a proportional or even marginal-rate regressive income
tax may arise in equilibrium if the proportion of ideologically neutral voters in group R, fR
is sufficiently high.
The equilibrium income tax satisfies the following first-order conditions,
The tax schedule will be marginal-rate progressive if, with a proportional tax schedule,
there is a profitable deviation to a more progressive schedule (with a higher tR or/and lower
tM). From the uniqueness of the equilibrium, this would imply that the equilibrium income
tax schedule can not be proportional or regressive since there would not be a profitable de-
viation from moving toward a regressive tax (lower tR). The condition is,
1
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PP MM RR tG tG tG t , G ,, () = () +− ()() + () αα α ff f 12 ,Since εj is increasing in wj the expression (1+εM(t)/1+εR(t)) < 1. Since xj is increasing in
wj (∂xj/∂wj = (1 – tj)lj > 0), which implies that xM(t,t)/xR(t,t) < 1. If fM ≥ fR, only marginal-
rate progressive taxes will emerge in equilibrium (note that this is stronger than needed).
Proposition 2. The equilibrium income tax is marginal-rate progressive as long as the
inequality below holds,
(8)
Proof. If, from the proportional tax, a progressive tax is a profitable deviation for Party
A, then [(Φ(t,t)(1–εM(t))xM(t,t)–fM)dtM + (Φ(t,t)(1–εR(t))xR(t,t)–fR)dtR] > 0 for dtM<0
and dtR >0. Dividing both sides by the RHS of the expression in brackets and rearrang-
ing terms we find the condition for progressivity (8) in the LW game.
We now follow the approach of Coughlin (1992), from Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) we
know that the outcome of the electoral competition game is the social alternative that maxi-
mizes a Nash social welfare function. For simplicity, we assume that Vj(tM,tR) = xj(tM,tR).
The party’s objective function is then,
In this game the political power of the poor and the rich is the same, the first prefers a
progressive (or proportional) income tax and the last a regressive tax, while voter M unam-
biguously prefers a progressive income tax, hence only marginally-rate progressive taxes
emerge in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If the elasticity of labor supply, εl, decreases with w, only marginal-rate
progressive taxes emerge in equilibrium.
Proof. Note that the CN game is equivalent to the LW game for Fj, independent of j (this
was previously stressed by Banks et al., 2004). In such a case fj = f, i.e. fM = fR. As proved
in Proposition 2, this is a sufficient condition for marginal-rate progressive taxes.
When voters choose a candidate (party) probabilistically the best response for both candi-
dates is to announce a marginal-rate progressive tax schedule. This is because when compet-
ing in elections, they try to attract swing voters: the ones that, through a slight increase in con-
sumption, are much more likely to vote for the party. The probability that a group votes for a
given party, say A, is concave in their consumption level (being lnVj a proxy of the probabili-
ty of them voting for the party). Then, voters in group P and M are more attractive than voters
in group R, since they increase faster the probability to vote for the party that benefits them.
Under our assumption of decreasing wage elasticity of labor supply, the preferred tax schedule
of P is either proportional or progressive. This guarantees that a move from regressivity or pro-
portionality toward progressivity is profitable. It captures more votes by swing voters, since the
marginal gain in increased consumption for group M is higher than for group R.
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6. Comparative Statics
We wonder at this point how the degree of progressivity changes as a result of changes
in the parameters of the model. Assume (2) is satisfied at the solution of SCN:(t*,G*).
Proposition 4. 1. In the CN game, an increase in the polarization of the population,
measured by α, decreases the progressivity degree.
2. In the LW game; an increase in fM (fR) decreases the equilibrium tax rate tM (tR). The
lump-sum transfer to the poor, GP, rises as fP increases.
Proof. At the equilibrium tax schedule,
(9)
We know that for t*
M = 0, ∂xM/∂tM < 0. So,
to satisfy equation (9). While for
So, necessarily
to satisfy equation (9). Consider now a different economy with α’ > α. Concerning the
second equation in the first-order condition in (9), at (t*
M, t*
R) it can be easily shown that
a higher α gives a higher weight to the negative part and a lower weight to the positive
part ∂xM/∂tR. Then at (t*
M, t*
R), 




R(α). Following the same logic, at (t*
M, t*
R), ∂π/∂tM > 0 for α’ >α,
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0Progressivity falls as the population becomes more polarized. 
2. In the LW model applying the implicit function theorem to the first order conditions
we study how tM changes in response to a change in fM,
as a result of the concavity of  (t,G). Substituting
in the above equation:
The degree of progressivity decreases with fR, since ∂Φ/∂fR=α/xR(tM,tR)>0 and more
generally sgn(∂tM/∂fj)=sgn(∂Φ/∂fj)>0, j=P,R. Finally the lump-sum transfer level GP is
increases with fP, the political power of the group whose preferred tax schedule coin-
cides with the peak of the Laffer curve. Note that since GM and G does not benefit group
P, both decrease with fP.
The previous result states that the degree of progressivity decreases with the political
power of group M, the group whose preferred tax is maximal progressivity. Note that this
happens irrespective of our assumption on the elasticity of labor supply. In CN the size of a
group measures his political power, thus regardless of how population is distributed among
groups, tax progressivity increases as the size of group M increases (or population polariza-
tion decreases). This is the case in both models. Finally, in the LW model the lump-sum
transfer, GP, increases as the political power of group P rises.
7. Conclusions
With this simple model, we wanted to show that even with the preferences specification
and only substitution effects from taxation, only marginal-rate progressive taxes will consti-
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supply (that εl decreases with w), which is satisfied by several familiar utility specifications,
makes it easier to introduce a marginal-rate progressive tax and makes middle-class voters
(M) more likely to become swing voters. We could say that provided that we wanted to show
that despite there is only substitution effects from taxation, only marginal rate progressive
taxes will emerge as the political equilibrium for the CN game. Our assumption on the elas-
ticity of labor supply (that εl is decreasing in marginal wage) is crucial for our result. It fa-
cilitates the implementation of marginal progressive taxes in both models (CN and LW) with
respect to the fixed or exogenous income case. Indeed the condition on Proposition 1 is hard-
er to satisfy at εl =0: xM(t,t)/xR(t,t)<fM/fR (condition in Proposition 1 for progressivity at the
fixed income case). In this context, labor disincentives make the wealthy group cheaper to
tax than the middle class.
The second point to highlight is that inequality is not one-dimensional. We also have to
think about the polarization of population groups, political power and about wage differ-
ences. Tax progressivity decreases with greater population polarization in CN model and, by
extension, progressivity increases as the middle classes’ political power grows in the LW
game. A larger degree of marginal progressivity is expected in societies with a stronger mid-
dle class.
Notes
1. Note that if we restrict the policy space to tax functions ordered by Lorenz dominance, a single parameter is
enough to describe whether the tax schedule is marginal-rate progressive. In this case, after-tax income can be
represented as xi = (yi)1-τ (y ∼)τ, where y ∼ is common to all agents (it is determined so that average post-tax in-
come equals per-capita income), yi is pre-tax income; and τ is the tax parameter, the tax schedule is progres-
sive (0≤ τ ≤1), or regressive if (τ ≤ 0). See for instance Bénabou (2000).
2. Utility functions satisfying this assumption and the assumption on the elasticity of labor supply are: v(lj) = –1/2
(lj)2, v(L – lj) = √(L – lj).
3. Given that there are only substitution effects from taxation and by assumption the second derivative of lj with
respect to tj is negative, εj will be decreasing in tj:
4. The plot was made for the particular utility function Uj = cj – 1/2l2
j. For this utility function t ˆM = t ˆR = 1/2.
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Resumen
El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar bajo qué condiciones un impuesto sobre la renta de tipo mar-
ginal progresivo surge como consecuencia de la competencia entre dos partidos políticos, cuando la
oferta de trabajo es elástica y los candidatos no conocen con certeza las decisiones de voto de los elec-
tores. Suponiendo que la elasticidad renta de la oferta de trabajo es decreciente, si seguimos a Cough-
lin y Nitzan (1981), ambos candidatos escogerán únicamente impuestos de tipo marginal progresivo en
equilibrio. Si, adoptamos más bien el modelo probabilístico de Lindbeck y Weibull (1987), el esque-
ma impositivo de equilibrio será progresivo si el poder político del votante con mayor renta es sufi-
cientemente bajo. El grado de progresividad disminuye con la polarización de la población. 
Palabras clave: economía política, impuestos progresivos, oferta de trabajo elástica.
Clasificación JEL: D3, D63, D72, H24.
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